INTRODUCTION
Scientists who communicate to the public or to policy makers, often via the media, confront choices about how to convey information responsibly and effectively. Whether by conscious decision or by default, such exchanges reflect positions on matters such as how to organize key ideas, where it is appropriate to simplify complex issues, how much explanation, background, and interpretation to offer, and so on. But often the challenge is not simply that of accurately conveying information in a concise and accessible way. There are also more contested choices about the extent to which one should "stick to the facts" or actively identify salient issues or potential implications of the scientific work, about whether to take steps to prevent the facts from being misunderstood or misapplied, or even about whether to be deliberate in attempting to set up matters of controversy in ways that resonate with or chafe against common values and assumptions. As a result of such selections, information gets packaged in a frame or narrative that shapes not only what people think but also how they think about it.
These questions about how to communicate scientific information responsibly have begun receiving attention from research ethicists, but there are still many issues to be resolved. For example, some commentators emphasize the importance of presenting information in ways that promote the public good (e.g., Shrader-Frechette, 1994) , while others argue that this goal can potentially come at the expense of maintaining scientific objectivity (e.g., Resnik, 2001 ). These concerns have attained special prominence in the context of recent debates about the appropriateness of framing information in a strategic effort to make the public more sympathetic to scientific findings about hot-button topics like evolutionary theory, climate change, and embryonic stem-cell research. While some figures insist that strategic framing can be a responsible way to help promote public understanding of scientific information (e.g., Nisbet and Mooney, 2007) , others argue that scientists should "stick to the data" and minimize any efforts to manipulate the public's responses (e.g., Holland et al., 2007) .
In this article, we explore these debates and suggest a set of strategies for framing scientific information in ways that minimize tensions between promoting particular interests (or what one perceives to be the public good) and maintaining objectivity. These strategies are all designed to assist information recipients in "backtracking" to relatively uncontroversial facts, which involves making explicit the values and assumptions in scientific activities so that the recipients of information can choose frames and conclusions that accord with their own perspectives and values. We illustrate these strategies using a recent case study involving biological research on voles and the impact of genetic alterations on their mating behavior. This work has received a great deal of attention in the popular press because of its apparent implications for understanding biological influences on human relationships, so it provides an opportunity to reflect on the responsibilities and opportunities for scientists to communicate effectively with the public. The next two sections of the paper will provide overviews of relevant ethical literature on scientific communication and of the recent scientific and popular literature on the voles case. The fourth section ("Strategies . . . ") will then develop our strategies for framing information in cases like this one in a responsible fashion.
THE ETHICS OF SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION: FOUR STRATEGIES TO ASSIST BACKTRACKING
questions about proper mentoring, data management, publication and authorship practices, and so on (Pimple, 2002) . However, in recent years a growing amount of literature has examined ethical issues surrounding the communication of scientific information (see, e.g., Douglas, 2008 Douglas, , 2009 Elliott, 2010 Elliott, , 2011 Hardwig, 1994; Kitcher, 2001; Pielke, 2007; Resnik, 2001; Shrader-Frechette, 1994) .
Unfortunately, as one turns to the specific ethical responsibilities that these ethicists have proposed, one observes some significant elements of tension. On one hand, scientists are expected to be highly objective and "true to the data." For example, Resnik (2001) argues that effective democratic decision making depends on scientists' not taking too much decision making power from the public (see also Resnik, 2009 ). Thus, he insists that scientists should be careful not to manipulate the information that they communicate, even if they are trying to benefit the public. Elliott (2010 Elliott ( , 2011 similarly argues that one of the central ethical responsibilities associated with scientific communication is to promote the self-determination of those receiving the information. In other words, scientists should strive not to smuggle their own values into what they communicate; instead, they should provide information in a way that allows citizens to make effective decisions based on their own values and perspectives (see also Hardwig, 1994) .
On the other hand, scientists are also frequently expected to provide information in a manner that benefits the public or at least minimizes harm. For example, Douglas (2009) has argued that experts should adjust their standards of evidence for drawing conclusions about policy-relevant matters based on a consideration of the societal consequences of accepting particular claims. Shrader-Frechette (1994) also maintains that scientists should respond to uncertainty by interpreting the available information in a manner that serves the public good. For example, she defends the somewhat controversial position that scientists should generally interpret ambiguous evidence in a manner that promotes preserving threatened lands rather than developing them. A commitment to benefiting the public also seems to be evident in the scientific community's emphasis on promoting public understanding and action in response to major contemporary issues like climate change. In his recent book Metaphors for Environmental Sustainability, biologist Brendon Larson argues that the environmental sciences are full of "feedback metaphors," which "harbor social values and circulate back into society to bolster those very values" (Larson, 2011, p. 22) . One of Larson's central goals is to promote greater reflection about these metaphors so that scientists can employ ones that better promote a sustainable society or, at the very least, to avoid metaphors that cause harm (2011, p. 220) .
But as Larson himself acknowledges, the dual commitments of benefiting the public and maintaining objectivity can generate tensions for scientists who seek to communicate information responsibly, as is evident in a recent debate about framing that appeared in the journal Science. In a Policy Forum piece, Nisbet and Mooney (2007) argued that scientists would do well to pay more attention to the ways in which they can frame their work in order to increase public understanding and openness toward scientific information. They suggested that this sort of strategic framing is particularly important when dealing with controversial topics such as evolutionary theory, embryonic stem cell research, and climate change. Their emphasis on promoting the public good was subsequently challenged, however, by a number of letter writers who worried that Nesbit and Mooney were moving too far in the direction of sacrificing scientific objectivity. For example, Earle Holland objected, "I would hope that researchers continue to rely on their data, rather than on what 'spin' on an issue might prove more convincing" (Holland et al., 2007 (Holland et al., , p. 1168 . Similarly, Stephen Quatrano emphasized that "many scientists would prefer to 'stick to the facts' in public for very good reasons. . . . When speakers frame 'the problem of climate change as a matter of religious morality', for example, they are using science to support a philosophical argument" (Holland et al., 2007 (Holland et al., , p. 1168 .
We see, then, that the tensions between different norms for communicating scientific information have come to a head in recent discussions about how to frame scientific work. In this paper, we suggest that scientists and others involved in scientific communication can go a long way toward easing these tensions by paying close attention to the major frames associated with the topics on which they work. By doing so, they can assist the recipients of information in "backtracking," which we take to be an important goal of science communication.
What we call "backtracking" is a process by which information recipients are equipped to recognize the major assumptions and values involved in particular instances of scientific communication. This process can go a long way toward easing the tension between communicating in a manner that benefits the public and preserving the self-determination of information recipients, insofar as it enables the recipients to retrace the inferential steps and value judgments by which experts arrive at theoretical and interpretive conclusions from their data. Ideally, backtracking would include providing information about the available data and the conditions under which they were generated. It would also involve clarifying the inferential steps by which experts move from the data to other conclusions. In practice, it involves at least the attempt to be explicit about the major or potentially controversial points at which value judgments are entering and the acknowledgement of the limitations and epistemic status of the conclusions drawn, so that they can be subjected to public scrutiny. By attempting to be explicit about which values have influenced their reasoning and in what ways, experts allow those who disagree with their characterization or weighting of the values to "backtrack" and consider how they would arrive at different conclusions or frames based on their own values and perspectives. Downloaded by [Daniel McKaughan] at 09:12 14 May 2013
We propose four strategies that experts can employ to assist information recipients in backtracking. Ideally, experts would (1) identify the weaknesses of the frames that they employ, (2) prevent common misunderstandings of those frames, (3) clarify the epistemic status of claims by differentiating wellsupported findings from more speculative statements, and (4) acknowledge major competing frames. In various ways, each of these four strategies contributes to the goal of enabling backtracking. For example, identifying the weaknesses of particular frames and preventing misunderstandings helps information recipients to avoid drawing unwarranted conclusions. Clarifying the epistemic status of different claims is crucial so that those who receive information can better determine when it is reasonable to draw different conclusions from scientific experts and when it would be unwise. Also, suggesting alternative frames is important so that information recipients have a sense of the range of perspectives available on a particular topic.
We take the goal of promoting backtracking to be central to the ethics of scientific communication. Numerous authors have argued that it would be impractical and harmful for scientists to eliminate all the frames, metaphors, and values from their communication (see, e.g., Cranor, 1990; Douglas, 2009; Elliott, 2011; Larson, 2011) . Nevertheless, if the scientific community is to maintain its reputation for being objective and for providing information in a manner that serves society as a whole (Hardwig, 1994) , it needs to find ways to acknowledge and address this value-ladenness (and, as part of a larger project, to improve public education about this aspect of science). Therefore, the goal of promoting backtracking is justified because it is one of the best approaches for maintaining a balance between the conflicting values of preserving objectivity while also seeking the public good.
1 When scientists employ frames that incorporate value-laden assumptions, they can ideally alert information recipients to the weaknesses of those assumptions, to the relative epistemic merits of those assumptions, and to alternative ways of framing the information based on different values and assumptions.
An important objection to our suggestion that experts should focus on promoting the ability of information recipients to backtrack is that it is somehow simple-minded or unrealistic. For example, it may be naïve to expect experts to reflect on the frames associated with their areas of work and to acknowledge alternatives to the frames that they prefer. Furthermore, even if experts were motivated to "undo" the impacts of their framing choices on their information recipients, it is not clear that they could actually do so, given that frames influence people's uptake of information in ways that are not entirely explicit. In fact, there is some evidence indicating that when citizens misunderstand scientific metaphors like the "balance of nature," further education about the metaphor may do relatively little to correct this misunderstanding (Larson, 2011, p. 210) .
Our response to this objection is three-fold. First, the scientific community tends to be very sympathetic to the goal of promoting the objective presentation Downloaded by [Daniel McKaughan] at 09:12 14 May 2013 of scientific information (Tanona et al., unpublished) , and thus many experts are likely to be motivated to recognize and acknowledge the weaknesses of the frames that they employ. Admittedly, it might be naïve to expect researchers with significant conflicts of interest to be entirely transparent about the judgments and values that guide their work (Elliott, 2011) . For example, there are those who have deliberately campaigned to mislead the public by emphasizing uncertainty in studies linking smoking to lung cancer, coal smoke to acid rain, greenhouse gases to climate change, and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) to depletion of the ozone layer (Oreskes and Conway, 2010) . However, critical feedback and a commitment to promoting backtracking on the part of other members of the scientific community can to some extent compensate for individuals who fail to take up this responsibility for themselves. A second response to the objection that backtracking is an unrealistic goal is that even if the strategies that we are promoting are not always practical or entirely feasible, they still constitute a valuable ideal toward which experts can strive and against which their practices can be evaluated. Third, the following case study illustrates that there are sometimes fairly easy and straightforward steps that scientists can take in order to assist their information recipients in backtracking; we are not asking scientists to do the impossible.
VOLES, VASOPRESSIN, AND THE CURRENT STATE OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION
Recent high-profile scientific publications and media discussions about the biological determinants of behavior in voles provide an opportunity to reflect on how scientists can frame information in ways that are both illuminating and responsible. Various species of voles exhibit interesting differences in social structure. Unlike montane voles and meadow voles, which lead a relatively solitary lifestyle and are "promiscuous" or indiscriminate in their mating, prairie voles and pine voles are among only about three to five percent of mammals classified as socially monogamous. Researchers are investigating the neural mechanisms underlying pair bond formation in these species. It turns out that, whereas the distribution of dopamine receptors in the ventral forebrain is similar between monogamous and promiscuous vole species, in this region of the brain (particularly the ventral pallidum) receptors for a neuropeptide called vasopressin are expressed at higher levels in male prairie voles. In the monogamous prairie vole, a long pattern of repetitive nucleotides in the promoter sequence for a particular receptor gene called the arginine vasopressin-1a receptor gene (variously referred to as avpr1a or V1aR) leads to increased expression of vasopressin receptors (V1aR). Ordinarily, this long pattern of repetitive sequences is almost entirely absent in the promiscuous meadow and montane voles. However, by infecting sexually inexperienced voles with Downloaded by [Daniel McKaughan] at 09:12 14 May 2013 a genetically modified virus, researchers can insert copies of the prairie vole V1aR gene into target cells in the meadow and montane vole brains. Strikingly, they find that when they manipulate the promoter sequence of this single gene, the male meadow and montane voles start acting more like prairie voles, exhibiting pair bonding, more frequent side-by-side contact ("huddling"), and biparental care .
Biologists are starting to understand enough about links between the genome, the neuroanatomical phenotype, the functional role of the neuropeptides that bind to crucial receptors, and their connection to the dopamine reward pathway to manipulate the system in a number of ways. Oxytocin and vasopressin are neuropeptides that, like the neurotransmitter dopamine, are released during sexual activity in both species. But the distribution of vasopressin receptors in specific regions of the brain is important; simply injecting vasopressin into the central nervous system of unmodified montane voles does not increase affiliative behaviors (Young et al., 1999) . Prairie voles have a much higher density of vasopressin receptors in the ventral pallidum and of oxytocin receptors in the nucleus accumbens than meadow or montane voles. These are regions of the brain associated with dopamine reward and reinforcement (Insel, 2010, p. 771) . Blocking the vasopressin receptors in males prevents pair bonding. Similarly, if one interferes with signaling by blocking either the oxytocin receptors or dopamine receptors in the nucleus accumbens of female prairie voles, pair bonding is inhibited; no partner preference develops after mating (Wang et al., 1999; Donaldson and Young, 2008) .
So it is well established that experimental manipulations of the promoter sequence of a single gene has a profound impact on complex social behaviors in voles, including partner preference, pair bonding, and biparental care . By modulating the density and distribution of vasopressin receptors in specific regions of the brain (i.e., causing vasopressin receptors to be overexpressed in the forebrain), scientists can get ordinarily promiscuous montane voles to behave more like monogamous prairie voles. Moreover, the proposed explanation seems plausible:
for social recognition, get activated concurrently with the reward circuitry of D2 dopamine receptors in the ventral forebrain, this association leads to a conditioned preference for a particular partner.
There are, of course, serious questions about how similar manipulations might translate into behavioral differences in other mammals. Studies of rats, mice, sheep, marmosets, rabbits, and primates are underway. Perhaps even more intriguing than behavioral differences across species, however, is the question of whether differences in behavior among individuals of the same species correlate with genomic or neuroanatomical variation. There is a growing literature using a broad array of new techniques to study vasopressin and oxytocin directly in humans. In a 2008 study, Walum et al. (2008) found that genetic variation among men in the vasopressin receptor gene (V1aR) displays a small but statistically significant association with the reported quality of the men's relationships. Paul Zak found that unacquainted people exhibit more trusting behavior in investment games if he puts about two teaspoons of oxytocin up their noses (see also Kosfeld et al., 2005) . (Since oxytocin has trouble crossing the blood-brain barrier and a short half-life once it crosses, Zak uses relatively high doses--typically administering about 40 IU of pure oxytocin to human subjects participating in trust game experiments.) Other studies indicate that oxytocin increases "trust, empathy, eye contact, face memory and generosity" (Insel, 2010, p. 774) . Another recent article in Genes, Brains, and Behavior reports that individual allocation of funds in dictator games are associated with the length of vasopressin receptor promoter regions in the players (Knafo et al., 2008) .
This biological work is exciting and suggestive, but by the time it is reported in the popular media it also gives rise to a circus of claims that go well beyond anything that the scientific results establish. As the headlines in Table 1 illustrate, it becomes a story about the discovery of a "gene for" "monogamy," "fidelity," "promiscuity," or "divorce" in humans. Discussions of the significance of work on vasopressin and oxytocin become sensationalized stories about convenient excuses for cheating, genetic screening for your fiancé, and pills that could help you fall in love, rekindle a failing marriage, get over the death of your spouse, or serve as pharmacological substitutes for will and character. They become stories about oxytocin trust sprays of potential use to the military, department stores, politicians, and stalkers preying on unsuspecting victims at the local singles bar (McKaughan, 2012) .
We have identified five frames that illustrate how this scientific work has filtered into popular culture (see Table 1 ) (McKaughan and Elliott, 2012) . These frames are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, but they provide an overview of the major ways that the research on voles has been addressed in public discussions. Many media presentations combine multiple frames into a single sensationalized report. One frame is genetic determinism, according Downloaded by [Daniel McKaughan] at 09:12 14 May 2013 to which a particular gene or molecule controls even complex social behaviors such as sexual monogamy. For example, as part of the lead into "The Cheatin' Gene: Researchers find men may be genetically predisposed to cheat" on the NBC Nightly News, anchor Brian Williams reported:
Throughout history men have come up with all sorts of excuses for behaving badly. Now it appears they have a new one. It's in their genes, apparently. This is a line of research that started with rodents called voles. Now it's being applied to humans (Bazell, 2008) .
Such coverage of one of the early studies of the vasopressin receptor gene V1aR in humans in 2008 could easily give the impression of scientific consensus that the complex behaviors in question are controlled by our genes. This coverage presents what are in fact wide open questions as if they were results of settled science. In 2009, Tyra Banks announced on The Tyra Show that "They finally found the best excuse in the book: Scientists are saying that many men have a cheating gene." After her announcement, a young man hoping to justify his behavior to one of his girlfriends said that he felt like cheating was "in my blood." Similarly, while struggling to come to a clear view about the vasopressin research and the degree of influence that human genes might have on relationships, NBC's Today Show chief medical editor Dr. Nancy Snyderman tells host Matt Lauer:
I think we should have to look at biology as a lot more complicated than this man, woman, forever monogamous, live forever. It's a perfect world in our society. But maybe our genes are telling us something else. And perhaps if you have a dinner table and you have your religion and your culture and how your parents raised you, maybe your genes are really sitting at the head spot at that dinner table and you all have to figure out how you're going to get along.
According to a second frame, "humans are like voles," key aspects of human behavior are influenced by the same factors that are present in voles, so research findings in voles can be employed reliably for understanding humans. For example, in a 2004 Telegraph story, "How a Cupid gene could stop men straying," Roger Highfield writes: "Boosting levels of a protein in the brain can make men bond with their partners and become less likely to roam, according to a study of voles that sheds light on the biology of romance." Such remarks interpret the vole research in anthropocentric terms, overlook the fact that even in voles increasing vasopressin levels has little effect without inducing changes in the location and density of vasopressin receptors, and spread misinformation about what science can currently do for one's love life.
A third frame, "triumph for reductionism," characterizes human experiences such as love in terms of physical and chemical processes. A good example of this angle on the research is found in "Love: Neuroscience reveals all," an opinion essay Larry Young published in Nature. "Poetry it is not. Nor is it particularly romantic. But reducing love to its component parts helps us to understand human sexuality, and may lead to drugs that enhance or diminish our love for another," the article begins. Now researchers are attempting to isolate and identify the neural and genetic components underlying this seemingly uniquely human emotion. Indeed, biologists may soon be able to reduce certain mental states associated with love to a biochemical chain of events. (Young, 2009) Similarly, in a review article examining recent work on "Vasopressin, oxytocin and social behavior" for Current Opinion in Neurobiology, Eric Keverne and James Curley observe that "most of our understanding of the neurobiology of social behaviour in mammals arises from the findings from two species of vole, one monogamous and the other promiscuous." They conclude, "The biological complexity of monogamy can be reduced to differences in V1aR distribution in the male brain, which underlies the formation of female partner preference through olfactory reward" (Keverne and Curley, 2004) . Similar themes are echoed, at a more popular level, in Valentine's Day pieces such as "Humans don't have monopoly on chemistry of love" from The Atlanta Journal-Constitution in 2009 and in "I get a kick out of you: The science of love (Love is all about chemistry)" from the Economist in 2004.
According to a fourth frame, "saving your relationship," the lessons learned from the research on voles can be used to develop drugs or other biotechnology innovations that can promote successful relationships or marriages. This research opens the door to medication to treat infidelity. If we improve the reward of vasopressin, then we increase the likelihood of faithful marriages. It also changes the valence of fidelity. If infidelity is a genetic variant, should physicians treat it like hypertension or diabetes? On the other hand, perhaps the infidelity gene is closely linked to the charisma gene, and as such, it is part of the package of seduction. (Vollmer, 2010) She concludes: "Perhaps we could sum it up this way: monogamy, one part family values, one part vasopressin responsiveness."
According to a fifth frame, "dangers of social manipulation," research on vasopressin and oxytocin provides potentially worrisome opportunities to develop harmful influences on society. Consider the response to a 2010 Science research article on oxytocin and intergroup conflict among humans, which concluded "Our findings show that oxytocin, a neuropeptide functioning as both a neurotransmitter and hormone, plays a critical role in driving in-group love and defensive (but not offensive) aggression toward out-groups" (De Dreu et al., 2010) . This study prompted the Times of India to run the headline "Love Hormone Could Also Trigger War." In another article, "Military about to drug soldiers with male bonding hormone?", David Gutierrez writes:
De Dreu warned against dosing soldiers with oxytocin in order to increase their sense of solidarity with their fellow troops. "Giving soldiers oxytocin might make them more cooperative towards their comrades, even willing to selfsacrifice," he said. "But it should [also] make them more likely to launch a preemptive strike against the competing army, with conflict-escalation being the most likely consequence." 
STRATEGIES FOR RESPONSIBLE COMMUNICATION IN THE VOLES CASE
Given this current state of discussion, what sorts of principles and considerations ought to guide scientists as they decide whether or not and how to communicate on such a topic? Experts face the potential for criticism when they offer judgments that go beyond what the evidence demands and they risk damage to their own reputations when they weigh in on controversial discussions. Therefore, it might seem that the sensible course is to attempt to remain above the fray, offering "just the facts." While this approach scores well on the goal of preserving the credibility of science, there are several reasons it is not the approach we recommend. First, the benefits of such an approach can also be enjoyed by taking care to clarify the epistemic status of various claims so as to allow readers to backtrack successfully to the facts in question if they wish. Second, a good many valuable insights would be suppressed if experts simply refrained from weighing in on issues of public significance. Not only can experts contribute to such discussions, they are often well-placed to participate in ongoing debates as responsible and well-informed citizens. There is nothing wrong with speculating about the topics identified in these frames, some of which merit careful philosophical reflection. But what is objectionable, on the grounds that it does both science and the public a disservice, is the suggestion that these further reflections, speculations, or judgments laden with controversial values enjoy the same evidential status as more straightforward and uncontroversial findings.
A third problem with the "just the facts" approach is that it is just as likely as our preferred "backtracking" strategy to face the objection that it is simpleminded or unrealistic. In this case the worry is that values still get smuggled into the conversation, only now with less scrutiny because of the pretense of value-neutrality. Such framing is perhaps most visible in polemical agendas or the kind of political spin one finds on cable networks such as MSNBC or Fox News which, ironically, cloaks the values and biases that implicitly shape its agenda behind slogans such as "Welcome to the no spin zone" and "We report, you decide." Given our current social context, science will inevitably be framed. If the question is not whether science will be framed but whether it will be framed well or poorly, responsible participation arguably obliges experts to work with science journalists to frame scientific reports judiciously.
Our suggestion, therefore, is that expert scientists and journalists would do well to try to understand the major frames available for communicating about this topic and to work to frame reports in ways that enable information recipients to backtrack. Those involved in communicating science to the public can take advantage of the benefits of particular frames while preempting and mitigating common misperceptions by acknowledging the weaknesses of the frames that they employ, seeking to correct misunderstandings of those frames, Downloaded by [Daniel McKaughan] at 09:12 14 May 2013 carefully differentiating well-supported findings from more speculative claims, and considering whether there are major alternative frames that they ought to acknowledge. Scientists could use the "Discussion" sections of their papers to provide some of these clarifications, and they could also do so in media interviews. Journalists could incorporate these strategies in their reports as well. Let us take a closer look at how this might play out in the voles case.
While many of the frames in Table 1 are crude and oversimplified, we suggest that they can help members of the public to understand how the vole research relates to broader social trends, issues, and debates. For example, the "genetic determinism" and "triumph for reductionism" frames alert citizens to the connections between this research and other work on genetic relationships to behavior. Similarly, the "dangers of social manipulation" frame assists citizens in recognizing parallels to other cases where scientific research has potential social ramifications that need to be addressed.
Nevertheless, once these frames are brought to the fore, many of their weaknesses and dangers are also apparent. We suggest that by paying close attention to the dominant frames used in highly publicized cases like this one and then employing our four strategies for enabling backtracking, scientists can take advantage of the strengths of particular frames without inappropriately sacrificing objectivity. Consider first the strategy of identifying weaknesses. Because the "humans are like voles" frame is a parallel that invites wide-ranging extrapolation, such discussions could be accompanied by sensible cautionary notes indicating that claims about how similar genetic changes might translate into behavior in the case of humans remain more speculative than the findings reported in the vole studies themselves. National Institute of Mental Health director Thomas Insel illustrates this strategy by suggesting that we take oxytocin and vasopressin receptor genes as "reasonable candidates to study in humans, recognizing that species differences are the hallmark of nonapeptide evolution" (Insel, 2010) .
Second, scientists could take steps to prevent specific errors and exaggerations that frequently occur in association with particular frames. For example, to correct a common source of misunderstanding in the "humans are like voles" frame, experts could emphasize that ordinary usage of terms such as "monogamy" can differ substantially from their technical applications in biology. What the biologists are typically talking about is social monogamy rather than sexual exclusivity (i.e., genetic monogamy) (Ophir et al., 2008) . The biologist's concept of social monogamy involves preferential association and cohabitation with a partner but is compatible with extra-pair copulations that would be incompatible with "monogamy" or "fidelity" as these are typically used in ordinary discourse for describing long term human relationships (Young and Hammock, 2007) . Another prevalent mistake is the idea that "Boosting levels of a protein in the brain can make men bond with their partners and become less likely to roam, according to a study of voles that sheds light on the biology Downloaded by [Daniel McKaughan] at 09:12 14 May 2013 of romance" (Highfield, 2004) . As a helpful corrective to this way of presenting the "humans are like voles" frame, experts could emphasize to journalists that it isn't the levels of vasopressin that make the behavioral differences in question but rather differences in the density and distribution of the receptors.
Consider another example of how scientists working in this area could both acknowledge the limitations of a common frame and prevent potential misunderstandings related to it. An expert being interviewed by a reporter framing a story for a wide audience around the topic of "genetic determinism" might decide that a few remarks anticipating and correcting prevalent false assumptions about the relationship between genes and behavior could go a long way toward preventing common misconceptions. Scientists who expect to be asked about these issues with some regularity might benefit from familiarizing themselves with relevant work in the philosophy of biology. For example, talk of "genes for" phenotypes such as "monogamy" or "divorce" or "undertaking vole research" regularly leads to conceptual confusions. Those facing the task of dispelling misconceptions about the nature of genes and causality could profitably draw upon the burgeoning literature on the nature of the gene, causality, and genetic determinism (e.g., Gould, 1978; Lewontin et al., 1984; Sterelny and Griffiths, 1999; Beurton et al., 2000; Moss, 2003; Griffiths and Stotz, 2007; Lewontin, 1992 Lewontin, , 2011 .
Third, experts can do a great deal to clarify the epistemic status of specific claims by pointing out how strong the evidence for a particular claim is, by indicating differences in the levels of evidence for various claims to be discussed in an article, by acknowledging limitations of a given study or the existence of other studies that suggest conflicting or more ambiguous results, and so on. For example, it is very clear that altering the vasopressin receptors affects voles' mating behavior. Scientists have also proposed fairly detailed explanations regarding the mechanisms associated with these changes at the neurophysiological level and have plausible accounts of how some of the relevant genetic and phenotypic differences evolved. But it remains unclear how (and to what extent or for what duration) similar alterations in the distribution of vasopressin receptors would affect human behavior. Rather than simply using the oxytocin studies to raise the spectre of menacing things to comesuch as the prospect of "spraying a captured city with a drug that would make its residents trust their new masters" (Klotz and Sylvester, 2009 )-experts can help put things into perspective by providing just a bit more information. As Antonio Damasio (2005, p. 272 ) points out, for example, "those with such fears" ought to be at least as concerned about traditional marketing techniques that likely already activate the natural release of oxytocin along with other aspects of the neural reward system. Moreover, spraying a captured city with oxytocin is unlikely to have the effects in question for reasons that experts are often able to point out on the fly during live interviews. In discussing similar kinds of questions about the potential abuses of oxytocin sprays, Larry Young Downloaded by [Daniel McKaughan] at 09:12 14 May 2013
and Paul Zak each point out that because oxytocin has difficulties crossing the blood-brain barrier (Young, 2011) and a half-life of about three minutes in the bloodstream, even intranasal administration of oxytocin requires high dosages to achieve even short term effects (Young, 2011; Zak, 2010) .
Finally, experts could also suggest alternative frames that counteract weaknesses in existing ones. Instead of focusing on "happiness drugs," for example, scientists could contextualize this research as a potential treatment for socio-behavioral deficits involved in Autism Spectrum Disorder, thereby focusing attention on the more realistic relevance of this work. We acknowledge that the effects of framing are often not easily reversed and that for this reason there is often a lot at stake in choosing initial ways of framing an issue. But this fourth strategy can be an important step in the process of enabling backtracking. It should also be emphasized that those who call attention to alternative frames have a responsibility not to neglect the third way of promoting backtracking, by calling attention to some of the main reasons for or against adopting various frames. The problem with simply mentioning competing frames without some indication of their epistemic merits is that this can, whether intentionally or unintentionally, give the perception of controversy about matters where there is scientific consensus-for example, on climate change or evolution. It would be remiss, for example, to mention that some representatives of the tobacco industry have promoted a frame of "no causal link between smoking and lung cancer has been proven" without some remarks about the current state of the evidence (Oreskes and Conway, 2010) .
CONCLUSION
Many of the frames identified in the voles case have deeply revisionary implications for how we ordinarily understand ourselves as persons-a point that underscores the importance of finding ways that thoughtful framing can enhance public understanding of the significance and ramifications of this sort of scientific work. Scientists should be able to speak freely on matters of public importance, even on those issues where doing so takes them beyond their capacity as experts. But the public need not give the same deference to scientists on matters about which they are no more entitled to an opinion than the rest of us. The goal of promoting self-determination of citizens and policy makers is also important, and we should learn to demand that experts attend to this responsibility. Public trust in science is or ought to be predicated on the expectation that experts will help the rest of us to backtrack-to trace the reasons, assumptions, and value judgments that entered into crucial inferences and frames-so that we can draw our own conclusions. By allowing this sort of backtracking scientists can enjoy the privilege of speaking freely while still maintaining the scientific community's reputation for objectivity.
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Although the goal of empowering readers to backtrack so that they might be better positioned to judge controversial matters for themselves is an ideal that will remain incompletely achieved, we have seen that it is a goal worth striving for. Clearly, the degree of transparency and informational cues that are appropriate and feasible to offer will vary according to context. However, we have seen that sometimes even a few well-chosen remarks can substantially elevate the level of public understanding and equip information recipients to better assess the implications of scientific results for themselves. Using the voles case as a source of inspiration and examples, we have attempted to assist experts by proposing four concrete, generalizable, and easily implementable strategies. By identifying the weaknesses of the frames that they employ, preventing common misunderstandings of those frames, taking care to differentiate the epistemic status of well-supported findings from more speculative claims, and acknowledging major competing frames, scientists can work with the media to develop frames that promote public interest in scientific advances without contributing to sensationalism and diminished scientific credibility.
